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Abstract
We study three remarkable cost sharing rules in the context of shortest path
problems, where agents have demands that can only be supplied by a source in a
network. The demander rule requires each demander to pay the cost of their cheap-
est connection to the source. The supplier rule charges to each demander the cost
of the second-cheapest connection and splits the excess payment equally between
her access suppliers. The alexia rule averages out the lexicographic allocations,
each of which allows suppliers to extract rent in some pre-specified order. We show
that all three rules are anonymous and demand-additive core selections. Moreover,
with three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and
a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander
rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version
of cost additivity and two additional axioms that ensure the fair compensation of
intermediaries.
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1 Introduction
We study shortest path problems, where agents must ship their demands of some com-
modity from a given source point to their respective geographic locations. Each agent
can transport her demand directly from the source to her location, or indirectly (through
intermediary nodes) if it turns out to be cheaper than the direct connection. The unit
cost of shipping the commodity between any two nodes is constant but specific to the
two nodes considered. We thus have a cost sharing problem where demanders have to
determine the cheapest route (or shortest path) allowing to ship their demands, and the
group has to decide how to reward intermediaries (who allow others to connect to the
source at a lower cost).
Examples of applications include airline networks (Bryan and O’Kelly, 1999; Yang,
2009), distribution of power supply (Dutta and Kar, 2004), small package delivery (Sim
et al., 2009), and biofuel supply chains (Roni et al., 2017). Dutta and Mishra (2012)
provide further examples on multicast routing, irrigation systems from a dam, and infor-
mation exchange. Most of the literature on shortest paths focuses on the construction
of the optimal network. Our paper, along with a few others, examines the problem of
splitting the total shipping cost between agents while satisfying some basic requirements
of fairness and stability.
Every shortest path problem generates a cooperative game (with transferable cost)
between the agents. A central and natural axiom is therefore the requirement that a
solution for shortest path problems should be a core selector: no group of agents should
jointly pay more than their stand-alone shipping cost. It is known from Rosenthal (2013)
that the demander rule, which charges to each demander the cost of her shortest path, is a
core selection. However, the demander rule does not reward intermediaries and produces
an extreme allocation within the core of every shortest path problem: it is thus unfair
towards access providers. Tijs et al. (2011) proposed a lexicographic rule that is core
selector and that was studied by Bahel and Trudeau (2014) in the context of shortest
path problems in order to compensate access providers. The current paper builds on
these two works by proposing (i) a new family of cost sharing rules that allow to reward
intermediaries (ii) additional axioms that are desirable in networks with linear costs; (iii)
the first characterization results in the context of shortest path problems.
In addition to the requirement of Core Selection, we investigate other properties. The
axiom of Additivity, whenever it applies, is a sensible and useful property in cooperative
game theory and cost sharing problems. In the context of shortest path problems, it
says that the cost shares should be additive in the cost matrix and the agents’ demands.
2
Given that the shipping cost is linear on every arc linking two nodes, we show (in Lemma
3.1) that one can construct demand-additive rules (that are core selectors) by studying
elementary problems (where a single agent demands one unit, and the others help her get
that unit from the source). This approach allows us to define the family of Anonymous and
Demand-Additive Core Selections (or ADACS). Anonymity simply says that the agents’
labels should not be used in computing the cost shares. We prove that the demander
rule and the average lexicographic rule (Tijs et al., 2011) are both ADACS (see Theorem
4.1 and Theorem 4.3). Moreover, we introduce the supplier rule, which charges to each
demander the cost of her second-shortest path and splits the excess payment equally
between her access providers. It is shown in Theorem 4.2 that the supplier rule is an
ADACS.
However, it turns out (as pointed out in Section 5) that cost additivity is impossible
to achieve. This impossibility is reminiscent of the one obtained in other types of cost
sharing problems within networks —see for instance Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2009)
for the case of minimum cost spanning trees or Bahel and Trudeau (2017) for the case
of minimum cost arborescences. We thus propose two weaker versions of cost additivity
that are compatible with Core Selection. The first version, One-path Cost Additivity ,
requires the cost shares in an elementary problem to be additive (in the cost matrix) only
within families of cost matrices that exhibit a common shortest path to the demander.
The second version, Two-path Cost Additivity, requires the cost shares to be additive only
within families of cost matrices that exhibit both a common shortest-path and a common
second-shortest path to the demander.
Two additional properties are studied in Section 6. Supplier Equal Change says that,
whenever two cost matrices (c and c′) have a common shortest path to j, the respective
cost shares of all providers of j (on that common shortest path) should be affected in the
same way when we move from c to c′. Path Independence says that a demander j should
pay the same joint fee to her respective groups (G and G′) of providers under c and c′
whenever the cost savings generated by G are G′ are identical.
Our results show that, with three agents or more, the demander rule is the only rule
satisfying both Core Selection and One-path Cost Additivity (see Theorem 5.1). On the
other hand, it turns out that Two-path Cost Additivity (which is obviously weaker than
One-path Cost Additivity) does not preclude rewarding access providers. We show in
Theorem 6.1 that an ADACS meets One-path Cost Additivity, Supplier Equal Change
and Path Independence if and only if it is a convex combination of the demander rule
and the supplier rule. To the best of our knowledge, the characterization results offered
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in Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 5.1 are the first axiomatizations of cost sharing rules within
the literature on shortest path problems.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define shortest path problems and
describe the framework. In Section 3, we formally introduce Core Selection and other
basic properties of cost sharing rules. In Section 4, we describe our three distinguished
cost sharing rules and show that they are all ADACS. In Section 5, we present te respective
versions of Cost Additivity, as well as the characterization result involving One-path Cost
Additivity. In Section 6, we focus on the axiomatization of convex combinations of the
demander rule and the supplier rule. Our concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
2 The model
LetN = {1, . . . , n} denote a set of n ≥ 2 agents who need to ship units of some commodity
from a fixed point 0 to their respective locations (0 is called the source). We emphasize
that this set of agents N is fixed and does not vary throughout the paper. A Shortest
Path Problem (SPP ) is a pair P = (c, x), where:
• c = {c(i, j) : i ∈ N ∪ {0}, j ∈ N, i 6= j} is a cost matrix of nonnegative numbers
giving the unit cost of shipping demands through each arc (i, j).
• x ∈ RN+ is the demand vector: each agent i ∈ N has a demand xi ∈ R+ (of the
commodity) to ship from the source to her location.
Let us denote by P the set of shortest path problems (c, x), and by C the set of all cost
matrices c. Note that: (a) the source 0 is not an agent, and (b) the unit costs c(i, j) need
not be symmetric —we may well have c(i, j) 6= c(j, i) for some i, j ∈ N . If c(i, j) = c(j, i)
for any i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, we say that the SPP has symmetric arcs.
Definition 2.1 Given i ∈ N , we call path (of length K) to i any sequence p :=
(pk)k=0,....,K such that:
1. pk ∈ N , for k = 1, 2, . . . , K;
2. p0 = 0 and pK = i;
3. pk /∈ {p1, . . . , pk−1} whenever 2 ≤ k ≤ K.
Note from Definition 2.1 that all paths p originate from the source 0 and cross any
location pk only once. Thus, the length of each path and the number of paths to any
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given i ∈ N are both finite. We denote by P i the set containing all paths to agent i. For
any path p of length K, let [p] refer to the set of players in the range of p, that is:
[p] := {i ∈ N : pk = i for some k = 1, . . . , K}.
For any subset M ( N and any path p (of length K) such that M ( [p], we write p \M
to refer to the unique path (of length K−|M |) where the agents ofM have been excluded
and the remaining agents (of [p]) appear in the same order as in p. To ease on notation,
we often write i instead of {i} and hence p \ i instead of p \ {i}, for any i ∈ [p].
Given P = (c, x), one can extend the cost function c to paths as follows: for any path
p (of length K) to i,
c(p) :=
K∑
k=1
c(pk−1, pk).
In words, c(p) stands for the cost of shipping one unit from the source to agent i via the
path p. For any i ∈ N , we call shortest path to i any path p¯ic ∈ P
i that solves the problem
minp∈Pi c(p). In all cases where there is no possible confusion about the cost matrix c,
we write p¯i instead p¯ic. Note that there exists a shortest path to any i ∈ N — since the
set P i is nonempty and finite — but it need not be unique. Given a cost matrix c, we
denote by P
i
(c) the set of shortest paths to each agent i ∈ N . The set of permutations
of N is denoted by Π.
Example 2.1 Consider the SPP (with symmetric arcs) given by P = (c, x), where N =
{1, 2, 3}, x = (2, 0, 1) and the cost structure is depicted by Figure 1. Hence, we have
c(0, 1) = 200, c(1, 3) = c(3, 1) = 10, c(1, 2) = c(2, 1) = 70, and so on.
One can see that there are 5 paths to agent 1, (0, 1), (0, 2, 1), (0, 3, 1), (0, 2, 3, 1),
(0, 3, 2, 1); and the shortest path to 1 is (0, 2, 3, 1), with cost c(0, 2, 3, 1) = 60+20+10 =
90. For agents 2 and 3, the costs of their respective shortest paths are c(0, 2) = 60 and
c(0, 2, 3) = 60 + 20 = 80.
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Figure 1: SPP with three agents.
For any vector y ∈ RN and any subset S ⊆ N , we sometimes use the notation
yS :=
∑
i∈S yi. The cooperative game (with transferable cost) associated with P can be
formulated as follows.
Define the cost of any nonempty coalition S ⊆ N by:
CP (S) := min
{∑
j∈S
xjc(p
j) : pj ∈ Pj and [pj] ⊆ S, ∀j ∈ S
}
. (1)
Equation (1) gives the lowest possible cost of shipping (from the source) the respective
demands of the members of S when using only the connections available in S. Note in
particular that CP (S) = 0 whenever xS = 0 (there is no demand to ship). We also adopt
the usual convention that CP (∅) = 0. As an illustration, for the problem P depicted in
Example 2.1, note that CP (N) = 2 ·c(0, 2, 3, 1)+0 ·c(0, 2)+1 ·c(0, 2, 3) = 180+80 = 260.
Definition 2.2 Given a shortest path problem P = (c, x), an allocation is a profile of
cost shares, y ∈ RN , such that yN = CP (N). Let A(P ) be the set containing all cost
allocations.
The above definition says that a cost allocation splits the (minimum) total cost of shipping
the demands of all agents in N from the source to their respective locations. Remark
that we allow for negative cost shares, which are desirable in particular if some agents
have null demands while providing others with a cheaper access to the source.
Let us now define the solution concepts studied in this work.
Definition 2.3 A cost sharing rule (CSR) is a mapping y : P → RN that assigns to
each P ∈ P a cost allocation y(P ) ∈ RN such that yN(P ) := (y(P ))N = CP (N).
6
In words, a cost sharing rule is a mechanism which, for any given problem P , allows
to divide between agents the total cost CP (N) of satisfying the respective demands (we
refer to this property as efficiency). A classic example of CSR is the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953). In the case of the SPP given in Example 2.1, the Shapley value picks
the allocation (260,−30, 30). In the following sections we introduce and study some other
specific CSR, as well as a number of desirable properties.
3 Core selection and other basic properties
The following definition provides the standard notion of stability: every coalition S ⊆ N
should jointly pay at most its stand-alone cost CP (S).
Definition 3.1 Given a shortest path problem P = (c, x), the core of P is the set
Core(P ) := {y ∈ A(P ) : yS ≤ CP (S), ∀S ( N} .
An allocation y is called stable if y ∈ Core(P ).
In particular, the Shapley value does not always provide a stable allocation. In Exam-
ple 2.1, (260,−30, 30) does not belong to the core because y{1,3} = 260+30 > CP ({1, 3}).
In shortest path problems, there are no congestion externalities in the sense that
shipping one unit to a given agent does not affect the minimum cost of shipping the next
unit to any agent, and so on for the following units. Using this observation, we first study
elementary SPP, which have the property that only one agent has a (unitary) demand.
For every j ∈ N , denote by ej ∈ RN the vector of demands characterized by ejj = 1
and eji = 0, if i ∈ N \ j. Let A,B ⊆ R
N and α ∈ R. We use the following conventions:
A+B := {a+ b : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}; α · A := {α · a : a ∈ A}.
Lemma 3.1 Given the problem P = (c, x),∑
j∈N
xj · Core(P
j) ⊆ Core(P )
where P j := (c, ej).
Proof. Fix a problem P = (c, x) and suppose that yj ∈ Core(P j) for every j ∈ N , where
P j = (c, ej). It then follows from (1) that∑
i∈N
yji = CP j(N) = c(p¯
j) (2)
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for every j ∈ N , where p¯j ∈ P
j
(c) for all j ∈ N . Thus, defining y :=
∑
j∈N xjy
j ∈ RN ,
observe that y is a well-defined allocation for the problem P , since
∑
i∈N
yi =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
xjy
j
i =
∑
j∈N
xj
∑
i∈N
yji
by (2)︷︸︸︷
=
∑
j∈N
xjc(p¯
j)
by (1)︷︸︸︷
= CP (N).
Moreover, for any S ( N , given that yj ∈ Core(P j) for all j ∈ N, we can write
∑
i∈S y
j
i ≤
CP j(S) for all j ∈ N . Therefore,
∑
i∈S
yi =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N
xjy
j
i =
∑
j∈N
xj
∑
i∈S
yji ≤
∑
j∈N
xjCP j(S)
by (1)︷︸︸︷
= CP (S).
Hence, y ∈ Core(P ); and we thus conclude that
∑
j∈N xj · Core(P
j) ⊆ Core(P ).
We now introduce a few basic requirements for cost sharing rules.
Given a bijection σ : N ∪ {0} → N ∪ {0} such that σ(0) = 0, and given P =
(c, x), P ′ = (c′, x′) ∈ P, we say that P ′ is σ-equivalent to P if it holds that: (a) x′i = xσ(i)
for all i ∈ N ; and (b) c′(i, i′) = c(σ(i), σ(i′)) for all i ∈ N ∪ {0}, i′ ∈ N such that i 6= i′.
Definition 3.2 A cost sharing rule y satisfies:
1. Core Selection if y(P ) ∈ Core(P ) for all P ∈ P.
2. Demand Additivity if y(P ) =
∑
j∈N xjy(P
j) for all P ∈ P.
3. Anonymity if, for all bijection σ : N ∪ {0} → N ∪ {0} with σ(0) = 0, and all
P, P ′ ∈ P such that P ′ is σ-equivalent to P , yi(P
′) = yσ(i)(P ) for all i ∈ N .
The present work focuses on CSR that satisfy Core Selection, Demand Additivity
and Anonymity. We call any CSR in this family an Anonymous Demand-Additive Core
Selection (or ADACS, for short). We search for stable cost allocations in elementary
SPP and extend these allocations (by Demand Additivity) to general SPP . By leverag-
ing the decomposition result of Lemma 3.1, one can easily see that the CSR thus defined
always satisfies Core Selection.
4 Some cost sharing rules
In this section we present three CSR that will be used throughout the paper.
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4.1 The demander rule
A simple CSR obtains by requiring every agent to pay the cost of her shortest path for
each unit demanded, with agents who demand zero paying nothing.
Definition 4.1 The demander rule yd is defined as follows: for all (c, x) ∈ P and
i ∈ N ,
ydi (c, x) = ximin
p∈Pi
c(p).
Remark that this rule is favorable to demanders: they do not have to compensate any
intermediaries who help them connect to the source at a lower cost. We show below that
the demander rule is an ADACS.
Theorem 4.1 The demander rule yd is an ADACS.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that yd satisfies Anonymity and Demand Additivity.
We prove Core Selection as follows. Fix P = (c, x) ∈ P and note that
∑
i∈N y
d
i (P ) =∑
i∈N ximinp∈Pi c(p) = CP (N). Moreover, for any coalition S ( N ,∑
i∈S
ydi (P ) =
∑
i∈S
ximin
p∈Pi
c(p) ≤
∑
i∈S
xi min
p∈Pi:[p]⊆S
c(p) = CP (S).
As an illustration note that, for the SPP depicted in Example 2.1, the demander rule
yields the cost allocation yd = (180, 0, 100).
Although the demander rule is easy to compute, it does not reward nodes that provide
a cheaper access to the source; and it is not difficult to see that the allocation produced
by this CSR is extreme in the core of every elementary problem. In the remainder of
the paper, we introduce and study other CSR that do reward access providers for their
cooperation with demanders.
4.2 The supplier rule
In this subsection, we define a CSR that charges to every demander j the cost of her
second-shortest path, and equally splits between all suppliers of j the excess payment
thus collected. Let p¯j denote (any of) the shortest path(s) to j ∈ N under the cost
matrix c. The supplier rule is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4.2 The supplier rule ys is the demand additive CSR defined as:
ysi (P
j) =


minp∈Pj\{p¯j} c(p) if i = j(
c(p¯j)−minp∈Pj\{p¯j} c(p)
)
/(|p¯j| − 1) if i ∈ [p¯j] \ j
0 if i /∈ [p¯j]
9
for each P = (c, x) ∈ P and i, j ∈ N .
From the above definition, note that (a) the demander j always pays the cost of her
second-shortest path (which is at least the cost of her shortest path p¯j) per unit demanded;
and (b) all agents i on the shortest path to j receive an equal compensation, which is the
absolute value of their cost share given by
(
c(p¯j)−minp∈Pj\{p¯j} c(p)
)
/(|p¯j|−1) ≤ 0. Note
from Definition 4.2 that, if there are multiple shortest paths to j, then every player i 6= j
pays a cost share of zero, that is, ysi (P
j) = 0. Therefore, the supplier rule is well defined,
because it is independent of which particular shortest path p¯j is picked. As stated in the
following theorem, the supplier rule belongs to the ADACS family.
Theorem 4.2 The supplier rule ys is an ADACS.
Proof. The supplier rule is demand-additive by definition. It is also clear that it meets
Anonymity. We show that it satisfies Core Selection. Fix P = (c, x) ∈ P and j ∈ N . From
Lemma 3.1, it suffices to show that ys(P j) ∈ Core(P j) for all j ∈ N . To avoid triviality,
we assume that {j} ( [p¯j]. Note from Definition 4.2 that
∑
i∈N y
s
i (P
j) = c(p¯j) = CP j(N).
Moreover, for any S ⊆ N \ j,∑
i∈S
ysi (P
j) =
c(p¯j)−minp∈Pj\{p¯j} c(p)
|p¯j| − 1
|([p¯j] \ j) ∩ S| ≤ 0 = CP j(S).
If, instead, we have j ∈ S, then it follows that∑
i∈S
ysi (P
j) = min
p∈Pj\{p¯j}
c(p) +
c(p¯j)−minp∈Pj\{p¯j} c(p)
|p¯j| − 1
|([p¯j] \ j) ∩ S|. (3)
We can then distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that ([p¯j] \ j) ∩ S = S \ j. Then, obviously CP j(S) = c(p¯
j) and it thus
comes from (3) that
∑
i∈S y
s
i (P
j) = CP j(S) = c(p¯
j).
Case 2. Suppose instead that there exists k ∈ ([p¯j]\j)\S. Then, p¯j /∈
{
p ∈ P
j
(c) : [p] ⊆ S
}
and it thus follows from (1) that CP j(S) ≥ minp∈Pj\{p¯j} c(p). Combining this in-
equality with (3) finally yields:
∑
i∈S y
s
i (P
j) ≤ minp∈Pj\{p¯j} c(p) ≤ CP j(S).
We illustrate the supplier rule by recalling Example 2.1. Note that the costs of the
second shortest paths to 1 and 3 are respectively c(0, 2, 1) = 60+ 70 = 130 and c(0, 3) =
100. Also, there are two intermediaries (agents 2 and 3) who help agent 1 to connect to
the source on the path p¯1 = (0, 2, 3, 1). We can therefore write: y(P 1) = (130,−20,−20).
As for agent 3, there is only one intermediary (agent 2) on the path p¯3; and hence
y(P 3) = (0,−40, 120). Thus, using demand additivity, the cost shares in the overall
problem are y(P ) = 2 · (130,−20,−20) + 1 · (0,−40, 120) = (260,−80, 80).
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4.3 The alexia rule for shortest-path games
In comparison with the two previous rules, our third distinguished CSR selects a more
central cost allocation inside the core. We describe the computation procedure as follows.
Fix a permutation pi ∈ Π. Focusing on an elementary problem P j = (c, ej), let p¯j
be a shortest path to the demander j and let m := |[p¯j] \ j|. We define a particular
cost allocation denoted by ypi. In the trivial cases where m = 0 or pi(j) = 1, we have
ypij (P
j) = c(p¯j) and ypii (P
j) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ j. Otherwise, we write without loss of
generality {1pi, . . . ,mpi} := {i ∈ [p¯
j] \ j : pi(i) < pi(j)} 6= ∅.
The procedure to compute ypi is formally described in Algorithm 1. Let us give here
Algorithm 1 Computation of ypi(P j)
1: for all i ∈ N do
2: initialize yi ← 0
3: choose p¯j ∈ argminp∈Pj c(p)
4: define m← |{i ∈ [p¯j] \ j : pi(i) < pi(j)}|
5: define α0 ← c(p¯j)
6: for all k ∈ (N \ 1pi) ∪ {0}, l ∈ N \ 1pi (with k 6= l) do
7: define c1(k, l)← c(k, l)
8: for all t = 1, . . . ,m do
9: choose pjt ∈ argmin {ct(p) : p ∈ P
j s.t. 1pi, . . . , tpi /∈ [p]}
10: define αt ← ct(p
j
t)
11: define ypitpi ← α
t−1 − αt
12: for all k ∈ (N \ {1pi, . . . , tpi}) ∪ {0}, l ∈ N \ {1pi, . . . , tpi} (with k 6= l) do
13: define ct+1(k, l)← min{ct(k, l), ct(k, tpi) + ct(tpi, l)− y
pi
tpi
}
14: define ypij ← c(p¯
j)− ypi1pi − . . .− y
pi
mpi
15: present ypi ∈ RN
a description of the steps of the algorithm. First, call pj1 (one of) the cheapest path(s) to
j among those that do not contain agent 1pi; and then assign to player 1pi the cost share
ypi1pi(P
j) = c(p¯j)− c(pj1) = α
0 − α1 ≤ 0. Next, consider the reduced SPP (N \ 1pi, c1, e
j),
where the cost matrix c1 is defined by: for all k ∈ (N \ 1pi) ∪ {0}, k ∈ (N \ 1pi) (with
k 6= l), c1(k, l) = min(c(k, l), c(k, 1pi) + c(1pi, l)− y
pi
1pi). In words, this means that any two
agents of the reduced problem have the option to connect via agent 1pi (after paying to
her the fee |ypi1pi |) in case they find it beneficial. Then, mimicking the first step for this
reduced problem, one can assign to agent 2pi the cost share y
pi
2pi(P
j) = c1(p¯
j
c1
)− c1(p
j
2) =
11
α1 − α2. We repeat the update of the cost matrix and compute the cost shares until all
intermediaries {1pi, . . . ,mpi} have been served. Finally, one must assign to the demander j
a cost share that covers the cost of the shortest path and the fees paid to all intermediaries:
ypij (P
j) = c(p¯j)− ypi1pi(P
j)− · · · − ypimpi(P
j). Since the computed allocation corresponds to
an arbitrary ordering of the players, a fairer and anonymous allocation rule obtains by
averaging over all possible permutations of the player set:
Definition 4.3 The alexia rule ya is the demand additive CSR defined as:
ya(P ) =
∑
j∈N
xj
1
n!
·
∑
pi∈Π
ypi(P j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ya(P j)
=
1
n!
·
∑
j∈N
∑
pi∈Π
xj·y
pi(P j) (4)
for each P = (c, x) ∈ P.
The following result states that the alexia rule belongs to the ADACS family.
Theorem 4.3 The alexia rule ya is an ADACS.
Proof. The alexia rule is demand-additive by definition. It is also clear that it meets
Anonymity, since it is computed by averaging over all possible permutations of the set
N . Finally, Bahel and Trudeau (2014) prove that, for every P ∈ P, ypi(P ) ∈ Core(P )
and hence ya(P ) ∈ Core(P ), since the core is a convex set.
The following example illustrates the alexia rule and Algorithm 1.
Example 4.1 Recall the SPP of Example 2.1, where x = (2, 0, 1) and p¯1 = (0, 2, 3, 1) is
the shortest path to agent 1. Fixing the permutation pi = 321 and the agent j = 1, note
that Algorithm 1 yields m = 2, 1pi = 3, and α
0 = c(p¯1) = 60 + 20 + 10 = 90. Thus, it
comes that ypi3 = 90 − 130 = −40 —remark that the lowest cost of serving agent 1 while
excluding agent 3 is c1(0, 2, 1) = 60 + 70 = 130 = α
1. The procedure then continues as
follows (for t = 2): 2pi = 2, c2(0, 1) = min(200, 120+ 10− (−40)) = 170 = α
2; and hence
ypi2 = α
1 − α2 = 130− 170 = −40. Finally, we get ypi1 = 90− (−40)− (−40) = 170, that
is to say, ypi = (170,−40,−40).
Proceeding as explained above, we obtain the cost shares ypi described by Table 1, for
each permutation pi ∈ Π and each elementary problem P j. Using the definition given by
Equation (4), it is then not difficult to check that ya(P 1) = (130,−20,−20), ya(P 3) =
(0,−20, 100). Hence, ya(P ) = x1y
a(P 1) + x3y
a(P 3) = 2ya(P 1) + ya(P 3) = (260,−60, 60).
It follows that our three distinguished rules are all ADACS. In order to differentiate
them, we introduce and study some additional properties in the next sections.
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Order pi ypi(P 1) ypi(P 2) ypi(P 3)
123 (90, 0, 0) (0, 60, 0) (0,−40, 120)
132 (90, 0, 0) (0, 60, 0) (0, 0, 80)
213 (130,−40, 0) (0, 60, 0) (0,−40, 120)
231 (170,−40,−40) (0, 60, 0) (0,−40, 120)
312 (130, 0,−40) (0, 60, 0) (0, 0, 10)
321 (170,−40,−40) (0, 60, 0) (0, 0, 10)
Average (130,−20,−20) (0, 60, 0) (0,−20, 100)
Table 1: Allocations ypi(P j) obtained from Algorithm 1.
5 Cost additivity: weak versions and a result
This section shows that it is not possible to require that the cost shares be additive in
the cost matrix c. As a consequence, we propose two weakened versions of cost additivity
that turn out to be compatible with our main axiom of Core Selection.
Definition 5.1 A CSR y satisfies Cost Additivity if y(c+ c′, ej) = y(c, ej) + y(c′, ej)
for any two elementary problems (c, ej), (c′, ej) ∈ P.
Cost Additivity says that cost shares should be additive in the cost matrix. However,
no CSR satisfies this property. Take for example N = {1, 2} and c, c′ ∈ C given by
c(0, 1) = c(1, 2) = c(2, 1) = 0, c(0, 2) = 1, and c′(0, 2) = c′(1, 2) = c′(2, 1) = 0, c′(0, 1) =
1. Then, for any j ∈ N , C(c,ej)(N) = C(c′,ej)(N) = 0 whereas C(c+c′,ej)(N) = 1 and hence
this property is incompatible with efficiency.
Definition 5.2 A CSR y satisfies One-path Cost Additivity if whenever two ele-
mentary problems (c, ej), (c′, ej) ∈ P have a common shortest path to j, it holds that:
y(c+ c′, ej) = y(c, ej) + y(c′, ej).
One-path Cost Additivity is a weaker version of Cost Additivity; and it is compatible
with efficiency, as our next results show.
Theorem 5.1 If n > 2, then the demander rule yd is the unique CSR satisfying Core
Selection and One-path Cost Additivity.
If instead n = 2 (say, N = {1, 2}), then a CSR y satisfies Core Selection and One-path
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Cost Additivity if and only if there exists a function α : R
{1,2}
+ → [0, 1]
2 such that, for all
(c, x) ∈ P,
y(c, x) =
{
α1(x) · y
s(c, x) + (1− α1(x)) · y
d(c, x), if c(0, 2) > c(0, 1) + c(1, 2);
α2(x) · y
s(c, x) + (1− α2(x)) · y
d(c, x), otherwise.
Proof. Suppose first that n > 2. Recall that the demander rule satisfies Core Selection
(as implied by Theorem 4.1). It is also easy to check that the demander rule satisfies
One-path Cost Additivity.
Conversely, consider now a CSR y that satisfies Core Selection and One-path Cost
Additivity. We must show that it coincides with the demander rule, that is, y = yd. Fix
an arbitrary problem P = (c, x) ∈ P; and let p¯j = (p¯j0 = 0, p¯
j
1, . . . , p¯
j
Kj
= j) ∈ P¯j(c) be a
shortest path to every player j ∈ N . We construct a new cost matrix ca as follows: for
all distinct i ∈ N ∪ 0, j ∈ N ,
ca(i, j) =


c(p¯j), if i = 0;
c(i, p¯jk+1) + . . .+ c(p¯
j
Kj−1
, j), if i = p¯jk for some k ∈ {1, . . . , Kj − 1};
c(i, j), otherwise.
(5)
In words, if i belongs to the set of suppliers of j under the shortest path p¯j, then ca(i, j)
gives the sum of the costs for the sequence of consecutive arcs leading to j from i.
Otherwise, we simply have ca(i, j) = c(i, j).
It is not difficult to see from (5) that
ca(0, j) = ca(p¯j) = c(p¯j) ≤ ca(pj), for all i ∈ N and pj ∈ Pj. (6)
That is to say, for any j ∈ N , both p¯j and (0, j) are shortest paths to j under ca;
Moreover, observe from (5) and the assumption p¯j ∈ P¯j(c) that me must have
ca(i, j) ≤ c(i, j), for all ca(i, j) = c(i, j). Thus, it comes that cb := c − ca ∈ C, since
cb(i, j) = ca(i, j) − c(i, j) ≥ 0, for all distinct i ∈ N ∪ 0, j ∈ N . Next, define the cost
matrices c0 and ck (for all k ∈ N) as follows: for all distinct i ∈ N ∪ 0, j ∈ N ,
c0(i, j) =
{
0, if i = 0
cb(i, j) otherwise;
ck(i, j) =
{
cb(0, j), if i = 0 and k = j
0 otherwise.
(7)
It is straightforward to see that cb = c0 + c1 + c2 + . . . + cn and c0(p¯j) = ck(p¯j) = 0,
for all j, k ∈ N . Hence, p¯j is a shortest path to every j ∈ N for any of the cost matrices
ca, c0, c1, . . . , cn. Given that c = ca+c0+c1+ . . .+cn, One-path Cost Additivity therefore
yields
y(c, x) = y(ca, x) + y(c0, x) + . . .+ y(cn, x). (8)
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But note that the cooperative game induced by P a = (ca, x) is additive, since its charac-
teristic cost function CPa satisfies
CPa(S) =
∑
j∈S
xjc
a(0, j) =
∑
j∈S
xjc(p¯
j) =
∑
j∈S
ydj (c, x), ∀S ∈ 2
N \ {∅}.
The problem P a = (ca, x) thus has a unique core allocation, (xjc(p¯j))j∈N = y
d(c, x); and
given that y is a Core Selection, we must have
y(ca, x) = yd(c, x). (9)
Moreover, since c0(0, j) = 0 for all j ∈ N , it is obvious that the Core Selection y should
pick y(c0, x) = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ RN . Finally, given that n > 2, remark from (7) that, for any
distinct i, j, l ∈ N , we have (a) ck(0, j) = 0 if j 6= k and (b) ck(0, i, j) = 0 = ck(0, l, j) if
j = k. Since y meets Core Selection, it thus follows from (a)-(b) above that yj(c
k, x) ≤ 0
(for all j, k ∈ N); and efficiency then implies y(ck, x) = y(c0, x) = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ RN .
Substituting these equalities in (8) and recalling (9), one gets the desired result:
y(c, x) = y(ca, x) = yd(c, x).
Suppose now that n = 2, that is, N = {1, 2}. It is not difficult to see that y satisfies
Core Selection and One-path Cost Additivity whenever there exists α : R
{1,2}
+ → [0, 1]
2
satisfying the properties described in the statement of Theorem 5.1. Conversely, we must
show that such a function α exists for any CSR y that meets our two axioms.
Fix then a CSR y that satisfies Core Selection and One-path Cost Additivity; and
define the set of cost matrices
C1 = {c ∈ C : c(0, 2) > c(0, 1) + c(1, 2)} ; (10)
C2 = {c ∈ C : c(0, 2) ≤ c(0, 1) + c(1, 2)} ;
C10 = {c ∈ C : c(0, 2) > 0 = c(0, 1) = c(1, 2) = c(2, 1)} .
Note that we have C = C1 = C1 ∪ C2 and C10 ( C
1. Let c˜ ∈ C10 be defined by c˜(0, 2) = 1
and c˜(0, 1) = c˜(1, 2) = c˜(2, 1) = 0. For any x ∈ RN , define
α1(x) =
{
y2(c˜,x)
x2
, if x2 > 0
0, otherwise.
We can now prove the following claims.
Claim 1 : y2(c, x) = α1(x)c(0, 2)x2, for all c ∈ C
1
0 and x ∈ R
N .
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Fix c ∈ C10 . The claim trivially holds (by Core Selection) whenever x2 = 0. Suppose
then that x2 > 0 and notice first that Claim 1 holds by One-path Cost Additivity when-
ever c(0, 2) = a
b
∈ Q (with a, b ∈ N \ {0}). Indeed, since c˜, c = a
b
c˜ and 1
b
c˜ all have the
same shortest paths to 1 and 2, applying One-path Cost Additivity repeatedly gives
y2(c, x) = y2(a(
1
b
c˜), x) = a·y2(
1
b
c˜, x) = a[
1
b
·y2(c˜, x)] =
a
b
·y2(c˜, x) = c(0, 2)α1(x)x2.
Consider now that θ := c(0, 2) /∈ Q and, for any t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, write θ = qt
1
2t
+ rt
(with qt ∈ N and 0 ≤ rt <
1
2t
) as the result of the Euclidean division of θ by the rational
number 1
2t
(remark that lim
t→∞
rt = 0 and lim
t→∞
qt
2t
= θ).
Since c = θc˜, it follows from One-path Cost Additivity that
y2(c, x) = y2(
qt
2t
c˜+ rtc˜, x) = y2(
qt
2t
c˜, x) + y2(rtc˜, x) =
qt
2t
y(c˜, x) + y2(rtc˜, x). (11)
But we must have 0 ≤ y2(rtc˜, x) ≤ rtx2︸︷︷︸
→0
by Core Selection; and Substituting these two
inequalities in (11) thus yields at the limit:
lim
t→∞
qt
2t
y2(c˜, x)− 0 ≤ lim
t→∞
y2(θc˜, x) ≤ lim
t→∞
qt
2t
y2(c˜, x).
That is to say, y2(c, x) = lim
t→∞
y2(θc˜, x) = lim
t→∞
qt
2t︸︷︷︸
→θ
y2(c˜, x) = θα1(x)x2 = c(0, 2)α1(x)x2.
Claim 2 : y(c, x) = α1(x)y
s(c, x) + (1− αd1(x))y(c, x), for all c ∈ C
1 and x ∈ RN .
Fix x ∈ RN and c ∈ C1. Again, assume that x2 > 0 (the claim trivially holds by Core
Selection if x2 = 0). First, notice that c = c1+c2, where c1 = [c(0, 2)−c(0, 1)−c(1, 2)]·c˜ ∈
C10 and c2 = c − c1 ∈ C. Second, remark that c1 and c2 have a common path to player
1 [which is (0, 1)] and a common path to player 2 [which is (0, 1, 2)]. Thus, letting
θ = c(0, 2)− c(0, 1)− c(1, 2), one can use One-path Cost Additivity to write
y2(c, x) = y2(c1, x) + y2(c2, x) = y2(θc˜, x) + y2(c2, x) =︸︷︷︸
by Claim 1
α1(x)θx2 + y2(c2, x). (12)
But Core Selection requires that y2(c2, x) = c2(0, 2)x2 = [c(0, 1) + c(1, 2)]x2: this is
because, under c2, the direct connections (0, 1) and (0, 2) are both shortest paths to the
respective players 1 and 2 — the core of P2 = (c2, x) is thus a singleton. Substituting the
value of y2(c2) in (12) thus gives
y2(c, x) =y2(c2, x) + α1(x)θx2 (13)
= [c(0, 1) + c(1, 2)]x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
yd2(c,x)
+α1(x) x2[c(0, 2)− c(0, 1)− c(1, 2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ys2(c,x)−y
d
2(c,x)
=α1y
s
2(c, x) + (1− α)y
d
2(c, x).
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Using (13) and efficiency —that is, y1(c, x) + y2(c, x) = x1c(0, 1) + x2[c(0, 1) + c(1, 2)],
one can write as well y1(c, x) = α1y
s
1(c, x) + (1− α)y
d
1(c, x); and Claim 2 is proved.
Let now cˆ ∈ C2 be defined by cˆ(0, 1) = 1 and cˆ(0, 2) = cˆ(1, 2) = cˆ(2, 1) = 0. For any
x ∈ RN , define
α2(x) =
{
y1(cˆ,x)
x1
, if x1 > 0
0, otherwise.
Claim 3 : y(c, x) = α2(x)y
s(c, x) + (1− α2(x))y
d(c, x), for all c ∈ C2 and x ∈ RN .
The proof of Claim 3 is omitted (it is similar to that of Claim 2).
Together, Claim 2 and Claim 3 mean that there exists α : R
{1,2}
+ → [0, 1]
2 such that,
for all (c, x) ∈ P,
y(c, x) =
{
α1(x) · y
s(c, x) + (1− α1(x)) · y
d(c, x), if c(0, 2) > c(0, 1) + c(1, 2);
α2(x) · y
s(c, x) + (1− α2(x)) · y
d(c, x), otherwise.
The two properties used in Theorem 5.1 are independent: The egalitarian rule, defined
as ei(P ) =
CP (N)
n
for all i ∈ N and P ∈ P, satisfies One-path Cost Additivity but fails
Core Selection. On the other hand, the alexia rule satisfies Core Selection but fails One-
path Cost Additivity. In order to check that, note in Example 2.1 that the allocation
provided by the alexia rule (Example 4.1) differs from that proposed by the demander
rule.
Corollary 5.1 If n > 2, then the demander yd is unique ADACS satisfying One-path
Cost Additivity.
If instead n = 2, then an ADACS y satisfies One-path Cost Additivity if and only if
there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that y(P ) = α·ys(P ) + (1− α)·yd(P ), ∀P ∈ P.
Proof. Given Theorem 5.1, it suffices to check that, if n = 2, then α1(x) = α2(x
′), for
all x, x′ ∈ RN+ . But this property easily follows from Anonymity and Demand Additivity.
Hence, if n > 2, our results yield the demander rule as the unique ADACS satisfying
One-path Cost Additivity. In the case where n = 2, the ADACS satisfying One-path
Cost Additivity are the convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule.
We now provide an alternative weakening of the axiom Cost Additivity.
Definition 5.3 A CSR y satisfies Two-path Cost Additivity if whenever two ele-
mentary problems (c, ej), (c′, ej) ∈ P have a common shortest path and a common second-
shortest path to j, it holds that: y(c+ c′, ej) = y(c, ej) + y(c′, ej).
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Two-path Cost Additivity is another weak version of Cost Additivity and it also
weakens One-path Cost Additivity. Indeed, note from Definition 5.3 that Two-path Cost
Additivity requires the additivity of the cost shares only when the summand matrices
have a common shortest path and a common second-shortest path to the demander j.
The axiom does not impose any restriction at all when these two conditions are not
met. In Section 6, we characterize a remarkable family of ADACS using Two-path Cost
Additivity and two new axioms.
6 A family of rules containing the demander rule and
the supplier rule
This section introduces some new properties that allow to characterize a distinguished
family of ADACS.
Definition 6.1 A CSR y satisfies:
1. Supplier Equal Change if whenever two elementary problems P j = (c, ej), P ′j =
(c′, ej) ∈ P have a common shortest path (to j) p¯jc = p¯
j
c′, then it holds that:
yi(P
j)− yi(P
′j) = yk(P
j)− yk(P
′j)
for all i, k ∈ [p¯jc] \ j.
2. Path Independence if whenever two elementary problems P j = (c, ej), P ′j =
(c′, ej) ∈ P satisfy c(p¯jc) = c
′(p¯jc′) and minp∈Pj\p¯jc c(p) = minp∈Pj\p¯jc′
c′(p), we have:
yj(P
j) = yj(P
′j)
for all j ∈ N .
If the shortest path to j remains the same from the cost matrix c to the cost matrix
c′, then the axiom Supplier Equal Change says that all suppliers of j should see their cost
shares change in the same way. Since the same agents contribute to shipping j’s demand
under both matrices, it is natural to require that no supplier of j be affected more than
the others by the passage from c to c′.
Path Independence says that a demander j should pay the same subsidy to her re-
spective groups of suppliers (under c and c′) if these groups have the same added-value.
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In other words, what should determine the amount paid to the suppliers is the reduc-
tion in the demander’s shipping cost rather than the size or composition of the group of
suppliers.
The next theorem characterizes the family of ADACS that satisfy these three prop-
erties.
Theorem 6.1 An ADACS y satisfies Supplier Equal Change, Path Independence, and
Two-path Cost Additivity if and only if it is a convex combination of the supplier rule
and the demander rule, that is to say, if and only if y = α · ys + (1 − α) · yd for some
α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. It is not difficult to check that both yd and ys (and hence their convex combina-
tions) are ADACS that satisfy Supplier Equal Change, Path Independence and Two-path
Cost Additivity. Fix an ADACS y that meets Supplier Equal Change, Path Independence
and Two-path Cost Additivity. By Demand Additivity, it suffices to show that there ex-
ists α ∈ [0, 1] such that y(c, ej) = α·ys(c, ej)+(1−α)·yd(c, ej), for all j ∈ N and all c ∈ C.
Consider an arbitrary j ∈ N and, for all c ∈ C, denote by βj(c) = minp∈Pj(c) c(p) the cost
of every shortest path (to j) under c. Moreover, picking any p¯j such that c(p¯j) = βj(c),
write γj(c) = minp∈Pj\{p¯j}c(p) to denote the cost of every second-shortest path to j.
1 Let
us then define the following sets of cost matrices:
Cj1 = {c ∈ C : c(0, j) = βj(c) or γj(c) = βj(c)} ; (14)
Cj2 =
{
c ∈ C : c(0, j) = γj(c) = min
p∈Pj : c(p)>βj(c)
c(p)
}
; (15)
Cj3 =
{
c ∈ C : c(0, j) > γj(c) = min
p∈Pj : c(p)>βj(c)
c(p)
}
. (16)
Remark that C = Cj1 ∪ C
j
2 ∪ C
j
3. For any c ∈ C, construct c˜ ∈ C as follows:
c˜(k, l) =
{
c(k, l) if (k, l) 6= (0, j);
c(p¯j) if (k, l) = (0, j).
Note that p¯j (a shortest path for c) is also by construction a shortest path for c˜, with
c˜(p¯j) = c(p¯j). Moreover, applying Core Selection gives
{
yj(c˜, e
j) ≤ c˜(0, j) = c(p¯j)
yj(c˜, e
j) ≤ 0, ∀i 6= j.
Since efficiency requires yj(c˜, e
j)+yN\j(c˜, e
j) = c(p¯j), it thus follows that yj(c˜, e
j) = c(p¯j)
1In case there exist multiple shortest paths to j, note that γj(c) is independent of which one is picked.
Indeed, observe in this case that γj(c) = minp∈Pj(c)\{p¯j} c(p) = βj(c), for any p¯
j such that c(p¯j) = βj(c).
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and yi(c˜, e
j) = 0 for all j 6= i. Hence, Supplier Equal Change gives yi(c, e
j) − 0 =
yk(c, e
j)− 0, that is,
yi(c, e
j) = yk(c, e
j) ∀i, k ∈ [p¯j] \ j. (17)
From this point on, we will follow six steps to complete the proof.
Step 1. For all c ∈ Cj1, we have yi(c, e
j) = 0 = ydi (c, e
j) = ysi (c, e
j), ∀i ∈ N \ j.
Fix c ∈ Cj1. Suppose first that c satisfies c(0, j) = βj(c). Then Core Selection requires

yj(c˜, e
j) ≤ c˜(0, j) = βj(c)
yj(c˜, e
j) ≤ 0, ∀i 6= j
yj(c˜, e
j) + yN\j(c˜, e
j) = βj(c),
which implies that yi(c, e
j) = 0 = ydi (c, e
j) = ysi (c, e
j) for all j 6= i. Suppose next that
γj(c) = βj(c). Then there exists another shortest path pˆ
j ∈ P
j
(c), that is, c(pˆj) = c(p¯j) =
minp∈Pj c(p), and k /∈ [pˆ
j] for some k ∈ [p¯j]. Note that we have yk(c, e
j) = 0 by Core
Selection. Indeed, we must have yk(c, e
j) ≤ CPj(k) = 0; and assuming yk(c, e
j) < 0
implies yN\k(c, e
j) = c(pˆj) − yk(c, e
j) > c(pˆj) = CPj(N \ k), which contradicts Core
Selection. Substituting yk(c, e
j) = 0 in (17) then gives yi(c, e
j) = 0 for all i ∈ p¯j and it
easily follows that yi(c, e
j) = 0 = ydi (c, e
j) = ydi (c, e
j) for any i 6= j.
Step 2. For all c ∈ Cj2 ∪ C
j
3, there exists αj(c) ≥ 0 s.t. yi(c, e
j) = −αj(c)
γj(c)−βj(c)
|p¯j |−1
,
∀i ∈ [p¯j] \ j.
For any c ∈ Cj2 ∪ C
j
3, note that γj(c)− βj(c) > 0 and then define
αj(c) = −
yN\j(c, e
j)
γj(c)− βj(c)
. (18)
Remark that αj(c) ≥ 0 by Core Selection. Recalling (17) yields the desired result:
yi(c, e
j) = − αj(c)
|p¯j |−1
.
The following steps will show that αj(c) is in fact independent of c and j.
Step 3. We have αj(c+ cˆ) = αj(c), for all c ∈ C
j
2 ∪C
j
3 and all cˆ ∈ C
j
1 that have a common
shortest path and a common second-shortest path.
Fix c ∈ Cj2 ∪ C
j
3, cˆ ∈ C
j
1; and suppose that c and cˆ have a common shortest path and a
common second-shortest path. It is easy to see that βj(c+ cˆ) = βj(c)+ βj(cˆ), γj(c+ cˆ) =
γj(c) + γj(cˆ) = γj(c) + βj(cˆ); and hence γj(c + cˆ)− βj(c + cˆ) = γj(c)− βj(c). Moreover,
Two-path Cost Additivity yields yi(c + cˆ, e
j) = yi(c, e
j) + yi(cˆ, e
j). Substituting the last
two equalities in (18) thus gives
αj(c+ cˆ) = −
yN\j(c, e
j) +
=0 by Step 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
yN\j(cˆ, e
j)
γj(c)− βj(c)
= −
yN\j(c, e
j)
γj(c)− βj(c)
= αj(c).
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Step 4. For all c ∈ Cj2 ∪ C
j
3 and all θ > 0, we have αj(θc) = αj(c).
Fix c ∈ Cj2∪C
j
3 and θ > 0. Note first that we have βj(θc) = θβj(c) and γj(θc) = θγj(c),
since c and λc have the same shortest path(s) and second-shortest path(s) to j (for all
λ > 0).
Second, remark that the statement of Step 4 holds if θ = a
b
∈ Q (with a, b ∈ N \ {0}).
Indeed, since c, a
b
c and 1
b
c all have the same shortest path(s) and second-shortest path(s)
to j, applying Two-path Cost Additivity repeatedly gives
y(θc, ej) = y(a(
1
b
c), ej) = a·y(
1
b
c, ej) = a[
1
b
·y(c, ej)] =
a
b
·y(c, ej) = θ·y(c, ej).
Combining this equality and γj(θc) = θγj(c) in (18) gives αj(
a
b
·c) = αj(c).
Suppose now that θ /∈ Q and, for any t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, write θ = qt
1
2t
+ rt (with qt ∈ N
and 0 ≤ rt <
1
2t
) as the result of the Euclidean division of θ by the rational number 1
2t
.
This means in particular that limt→∞ rt = 0 and limt→∞
qt
2t
= θ.
It follows from Two-path Cost Additivity that
yN\j(θc, e
j) =yN\j(
qt
2t
c+ rtc, e
j)
=yN\j(
qt
2t
c, ej) + yN\j(rtc, e
j)
=
qt
2t
yN\j(c, e
j) + yN\j(rtc, e
j) since
qt
2t
∈ Q. (19)
By Core Selection, we must have − rt(c(0, j)− αj(c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
≤ yN\j(rtc, e
j) ≤ 0. Substituting
these two inequalities in (19) and taking the limit thus gives
lim
t→∞
qt
2t
yN\j(c, e
j)− 0 ≤ lim
t→∞
yN\j(θc, e
j) ≤ lim
t→∞
qt
2t
yN\j(c, e
j).
That is, yN\j(θc, e
j) = limt→∞ yN\j(θc, e
j) = limt→∞
qt
2t︸︷︷︸
→θ
yN\j(c, e
j) = θyN\j(c, e
j). Fi-
nally, using yN\j(θc, e
j) = θyN\j(c, e
j) in (18) [and recalling that βj(θc) = θβj(c), γj(θc) =
θγj(c)] gives the desired result, αj(c) = αj(θc).
Step 5. We have αj(c) = αj(c
′) ≤ 1, for all c, c′ ∈ Cj2.
Let c, c′ ∈ Cj2. We will distinguish two cases.
Substep 5.1. Suppose first that c(p¯jc) = c
′(p¯jc′) and
βj(c)︷ ︸︸ ︷
min
p∈Pj\p¯j
c(p) =
βj(c
′)︷ ︸︸ ︷
min
p∈Pj\p¯j
c′
c′(p).
Then it follows from Path Independence that yj(c, e
j) = yj(c
′, ej), that is to say,
yN\j(c, e
j) = c(p¯j) − yj(c, e
j) = c′(p¯jc′) − yj(c
′, ej) = yN\j(c
′, ej). Substituting in (18)
hence gives αj(c) = αj(c
′).
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Substep 5.2. Suppose now that c(p¯j) 6= c′(p¯jc′) or βj(c) 6= βj(c
′).
Since c, c′ ∈ Cj2, notice that βj(c) − αj(c) > 0 and βj(c
′) − αj(c
′) > 0. Letting then
θ =
βj(c)−αj(c)
βj(c′)−αj(c′)
> 0, define the cost matrix c˜′ ≡ θc′ ∈ Cj2. It comes from Step 4 that
αj(c˜
′) = αj(c˜). (20)
Also note that we have
βj(c˜
′)− αj(c˜
′) = θ(βj(c
′)− αj(c
′)) = βj(c)− αj(c). (21)
Assuming without loss of generality that δ ≡ αj(c˜
′)−αj(c) > 0 and p¯
j = (0, i1, . . . , iK−1, j),
define the cost matrix cˆ as follows:
cˆ(k, l) =


δ if (k, l) = (0, j), (0, i1);
0 if (k, l) = (it, it+1) for some t = 1, . . . , K − 1;
δ + 1 otherwise.
Note that (i) p¯j = (0, i1, . . . , iK−1, j) is a shortest path for cˆ (as well as c); and (ii) (0, j)
is a second-shortest path for cˆ and (as well as c), with cˆ(p¯j) = cˆ(0, j) = δ (i.e, cˆ ∈ Cj1).
Therefore, letting c˜ = c+ cˆ, it comes from Step 3 that
αj(c˜) = αj(c+ cˆ) = αj(c). (22)
Furthermore, (i)-(ii) above mean that
αj(c˜) = δ + αj(c) = αj(c˜
′); βj(c˜) = δ + βj(c) = αj(c˜
′)− αj(c) + βj(c)
by (21)︷︸︸︷
= βj(c˜
′). (23)
Since c˜, c˜′ ∈ Cj2, it comes from (23) and Substep 5.1 above that αj(c˜) = αj(c˜
′). Combining
this equality with (22) and (20) hence gives αj(c) = αj(c
′), which is the desired result.
To conclude Step 5, remark that writing αj(c) > 1 for some c ∈ C
j
2 would mean in
Equation (18) that yN\j(c, e
j) < −(γj(c)− βj(c)), that is to say,
yj(c, e
j) = βj(c)− yN\j(c, e
j) > βj(c) + (γj(c)− βj(c)) = γj(c) = c(0, j);
and this would violate Core Selection.
Step 6. For all c, c′ ∈ C2 ∪ C3, we have αj(c) = αj(c
′).
For any c ∈ C2 ∪ C3, perform the decomposition c = c˜+ cˆ, where
c˜(k, l) =
{
γj(c) if (k, l) = (0, j)
c(k, l) otherwise
(24)
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cˆ(k, l) =
{
c(0, j)− γj(c) if (k, l) = (0, j)
0 otherwise.
(25)
Since c(0, j) ≥ γj(c) > c(p¯
j) (because cˆ ∈ C2 ∪ C3), observe from (24)-(25) that (i) p¯
j
is a common shortest path for c˜ and cˆ; (ii) (0, j) is a common second-shortest path for c˜
and cˆ; (iii) c˜ ∈ Cj2 and cˆ ∈ C
j
1. Hence, by Step 3, we have
αj(c) = αj(c˜), ∀c ∈ C2 ∪ C3. (26)
Pick then any c, c′ ∈ C2∪C3. It comes from (26) that αj(c) = αj(c˜) and αj(c
′) = αj(c˜
′).
But given that c˜, c˜′ ∈ Cj2, we have αj(c˜) = αj(c˜
′) from Step 5; and hence αj(c) = αj(c
′).
We are now ready to conclude the proof of Theorem 6.1. The six steps above allow
to claim that, for all j ∈ N , there exists αj ∈ [0, 1] such that
y(c, ej) = αj y
s(c, ej)︸ ︷︷ ︸
γj(c)
+(1− αj) y
d(c, ej)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βj(c)
, ∀c ∈ C. (27)
It now remains to show that αj = αj′ for any j, j
′ ∈ N .
Fix distinct j, j′ ∈ N and pick any c ∈ C such that γj(c) > βj(c). Recalling (27) gives
yj(c, e
j) = βj(c) + αj(γj(c)− βj(c)). (28)
Defining c′ ∈ C by c′(k, l) = c(σjj′(k), σjj′(l)) for all (k, l), remark that γj′(c
′) = γj(c) and
βj′(c
′) = βj(c). It thus comes from (27) that
yj′(c
′, ej
′
) = βj′(c
′) + αj′(γj′(c
′)− βj′(c
′)) = βj(c) + αj′(γj(c)− βj(c)). (29)
Since c and c′ are jj′-symmetric, observe that Anonymity gives yj′(c
′, ej
′
) = yj(c, e
j).
Combining this equality with (28) and (29) finally gives αj = αj′ .
Theorem 6.1 says that, within the set of ADACS, we must pick a convex combination
of ys and yd if one requires the cost sharing mechanism to satisfy the three requirements of
Supplier Equal Change, Path Independence, and Two-path Cost Additivity. Within this
family, the demander rule yd is the most advantageous to the demander j and the supplier
rule ys is the most advantageous to j’s suppliers. A natural compromise is obtained by
taking the average of these two extremes: y = 1
2
ys + 1
2
yd.
We now argue that the three axioms used in the characterization are independent.
First, define the ADACS y˜: for all (c, ej)∈ P and i ∈ N ,
y˜i(c, e
j) =


β(c)−γ(c)
|p¯j |
if i ∈ [p¯j] \ j;
γ(c) + β(c)−γ(c)
|p¯j |
if i = j;
0 otherwise.
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Note that y˜ satisfies Supplier Equal Change and Two-Path Additivity, but it violates
Path Independence because the cost share paid by a demander, y˜j(c, e
j) = γ(c)+ β(c)−γ(c)
|p¯j |
,
depends on the length of the shortest path to j. Indeed, if we take two matrices c
and c′ such that β(c) = β(c′) and γ(c) = γ(c′) but |p¯jc| > |p¯
j
c′ |, then we will have
yj(c, e
j) > yj(c, e
j), a violation of Path Independence.
Second, define the ADACS yˆ: for all (c, ej) and i ∈ N ,
yˆi(c, e
j) =


β(c)− γ(c) if i = mink∈[p¯j ]\j k;
γ(c) if i = j;
0 otherwise.
Remark that y˜ satisfies Two-Path Additivity and Path Independence, but it does not
meet Supplier Equal Change since only the lowest-label supplier of j sees her cost share
decrease when we move from a matrix c to a matrix c′ such that p¯j ∈ P
j
(c) ∩P
j
(c′) and
γ(c) = 0 < β(c′)− γ(c′). This is a violation of Supplier Equal Change.
Finally, recalling the demander rule yd and the supplier rule ys, consider the ADACS
y˘ defined as follows: for all (c, ej) and i ∈ N,
y˘(c, ej) =
{
ys(c, ej) if β(c) > 100
yd(c, ej) otherwise.
It is easy to see that y˘ satisfies Supplier Equal Change and Path Independence. How-
ever, note that y˘ violates Two-Path Additivity since y˘(λ·c, ej) 6= λ·y˘(c, ej) for any c ∈ C
such that β(c) = 60 and any λ ≥ 2, even though the two matrices c and λ·c have identical
shortest paths and identical second-shortest paths.
7 Conclusion
The paper has introduced the family of Anonymous and Demand-Additive Core Selections
(or ADACS) for shortest path problems, which are network problems where the shipping
cost on every arc (linking two nodes) is linear in the flow crossing it.
We have identified three remarkable rules that belong to the family of ADACS: the
demander rule, the supplier rule, and the alexia rule.
Besides the standard axiom of Core Selection, we have introduced and studied many
properties that are natural for shortest path problems. In particular, it has been shown
that only restricted versions of Cost Additivity are possible. With three players or more,
the property of One-path Cost Additivity (combined with Core Selection) characterizes
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the demander rule. On the other hand, we have shown that the combination of Two-Path
Cost Additivity, Supplier Equal Change and Path Independence characterizes the convex
combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule (within the family of ADACS).
These results provide the first axiomatizations of cost sharing rules in the context of
shortest path problems. Future research proposing additional rules, axioms, or charac-
terization results would certainly contribute to this literature.
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